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Abstract
This paper concentrates on one technological aspect of
providingcommunicationssecurity, ﬁrewall technology.
It introduces a formalism called Hierarchical Colored
Petri Nets (HCPN) in tutorial style. The main contribu-
tion of the paper is a description of how to model ﬁre-
wall systems using Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets. A
byproduct of this approach is a novel way of modeling
audit streams in distributed systems.
HCPNs are well suited for modeling concurrent, dis-
tributed systems in which regulated ﬂows of informa-
tion are signiﬁcant, such as ﬁrewall systems which en-
force access control policies on network packets. The
paper introduces the basics of this modeling technique.
It demonstrates with several examples how ﬁrewalls can
be modeled. It outlines how simulations of such mod-
els can facilitate testing, performance analysis, and in-
teractive design exploration. Finally, the approach can
serve as the basis for formal analysis techniques avail-
able through Applied Petri Net Theory.
1 Introduction
Data communications networks have become an infras-
tructure resource for businesses, corporations, govern-
ment agencies, and academic institutions. Computer
networking, however, is not without risks as Howard
([18]) illustrates in his analysis of over 4000 security in-
cidents on the Internetbetween 1989 and 1995. Firewall
technologyisonlyonemechanismtoprotectagainstnet-
workbased attack methods. A balancedapproachto net-
work protection must include physical security, person-
nel security, operations security, communication secu-
rity, and social mechanisms ([20, Part II]).
Classically, ﬁrewall technology has been applied to
TCP/IP (transmission control protocol,[ 3 6 ] ;internet
protocol, [37]) internetworks. Firewalls are used to
guard and isolate connected segments of internetworks.
“Inside” network domains are protected against “out-
side” untrusted networks, or parts of a network are pro-
tected against each other. Various architectures for ﬁre-
walls have been published and built (see section 3).
Landwehr suggests the application of formal models
of security to secure system design (see [26,
x
1]): by
demonstrating that a design to which an implementa-
tion corresponds enforces a formal model of security, a
convincing argument can be made that the system is se-
cure. Firewall systems are often implemented through
a number of mechanisms that collectively achieve the
desired functionality. This paper introduces a formal-
ism based on Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets (HCPN,
short CPN) to describe the functionality of such mecha-
nisms. CPNs are a formalism well suited for modeling
systems in which synchronization,concurrency,compo-
sition, and activities on regulated ﬂows of information
are signiﬁcant ([24]). It can be used for the represen-
tation, combination, simulation, and analysis of ﬁrewall
components and ﬁrewall systems. The introduction of
this design approach is the main contribution of this pa-
per.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deﬁnes
terminology used throughout this paper. Section 3 pro-
vides a brief overview of ﬁrewall mechanisms. Sec-
tion 4 introduces Colored Petri Nets (CPN) and Hierar-
chical CPNs (HCPN) as formalisms for modeling ﬁre-
wall mechanisms and ﬁrewall systems. Section 5 de-
scribes the modeling of an example ﬁrewall that com-
bines two ﬁrewall mechanisms, an IP packet ﬁlter and
an IPSEC (IP security working group) authentication
header (AH) module ([2]). Section 6 describeshow sim-
ulation can be used to facilitate the generationof various
results about modeled systems, such as performance re-
sults and functionality assurance through testing. Sec-
1tion 7 discusses some of the approaches available by
means of Applied Petri Net Theory to formally analyze
modeled systems. The paper closes with section 8, sum-
marizingitscontributionsandpresentingideasforfuture
research.
2 Terminology
Thissectiondeﬁnesterminologyusedthroughoutthepa-
per and gives a working deﬁnition of the term ﬁrewall
technology. Technical terms not deﬁned in this section
areusedaccordingtotheirdeﬁnitionsin[6,11,27]. Def-
initions in this section are based in [44, 6, 11, 27] but
extended to ﬁt our needs.
We deﬁne communication trafﬁc to be the transmis-
sion of information over a network. We denote the set
of all possible transmissions by l T. Any instance of com-
munication trafﬁc, called a transmission unit, is a tuple
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but not both. The interpretation of what amount of in-
formation comprises a transmission unit depends on the
protocol layer of observation. For example, in a popular
instance of network layer functionality (see ISO model
[13]), the Internet Protocol ([36]), transmission units are
called datagrams,o rpackets.
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tain application-speciﬁc payload or a payload that, at a
higher layer of abstraction, can be interpreted as a trans-
mission unit in itself. Transmission units do not need to
contain all ﬁelds of
t. For example, some ﬁelds may not
be necessary at all, such as
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a in control messages;
others may be available through established state, such
as
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s in an existing connection.
A security policy is the deﬁnition of the security
requirements for a given system. It can be deﬁned
as a set of standards, rules, or practices. We de-
ﬁne a network domain security policy l P as a sub-
set of a security policy, addressing requirements for
authenticity and integrity of communication trafﬁc
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A network policy domain l D is a set of interconnected
networks, gateways, and hosts offering services which
are governed by a network domain security policy l P.
Using the above deﬁned terminology and a study of
ﬁrewall systemsasdescribedinsection3 wearriveat the
following working deﬁnition of the term ﬁrewall tech-
nology.
Firewall technology is a set of mechanisms that can
enforce a network domain security policy l P on commu-
nication trafﬁc l T entering or leaving a network policy
domain l D in a fashion transparent to the user. A ﬁrewall
system,o rﬁrewall, is an instantiationof ﬁrewalltechnol-
ogy.
3 Firewall Mechanisms
In recent yearsleading up to mid 1997, a number of ﬁre-
wall architectureshavebeen proposedand implemented.
A variety of security mechanisms were developed and
used, such as packet ﬁltering, packet labeling, network
address translation, or proxy forwarding. Several re-
search papers and some text booksdescribe the different
approaches(see e.g., [16,
x21],[6], [10], [47], [39], [41],
[40], [42], [4], [3], and [1]).
4 Formalism for Firewall Mech-
anisms: Hierarchical Colored
Petri Nets
This section introduces Colored Petri Nets (CPN) and
Hierarchical CPNs (HCPN) as formalisms for ﬁrewall
mechanisms and ﬁrewall systems. The section begins
by arguing why we chose CPNs as a formalism. It
then introduces the graphical representations of CPNs
and HCPNs, explains their modeling equivalence and
presents some limitations of CPNs.
APetri Net ([33])isamodelexpressedasanetworkof
interconnectedlocationsandactivitieswithrulesthatde-
termine when an activity can occur. It also speciﬁes how
an activity changes the states of the locations associated
with it. Petri Nets have been used for the modeling and
analysis of systems ([32]). A considerable body of the-
ory exists ([34]) dealing with Petri Net properties, such
as liveness and reliability. Petri Nets have been devel-
oped over the years from a simple yet universally appli-
cable paradigm to various high-level and more complex
but far more convenient methodologies: one such ex-
ample is Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets. Their formal
deﬁnition can be found in [22] and [24].
The following paragraphs are a summary of features
that CPNs possess. These features make CPNs ap-
propriate and ﬁtting for modeling ﬁrewall mechanisms
and systems. The summary is compiled from [23, 24].
CPNs promote problem-oriented structuring of a sys-
tem and make it possible to formulate and prove system
characteristics. They offer hierarchical descriptions and
are suited for modeling systems of distributed control
with multiple processes executing concurrently in time.
2These characteristics support the modeling of ﬁrewalls
that are distributed systems consisting of several inter-
acting mechanisms. CPNs are asynchronous in nature
without an inherent measure of time although a measure
of time has been added in various extensions. The lack
of time reﬂects a philosophy that states that the only im-
portant property of time, from a logical point of view, is
in deﬁninga partial orderingof the occurrenceofevents.
There are a large number of formal analysis methods by
which properties of instances of CPNs can be proved.
Computer support for complex analysis methods makes
it possible to obtain results that are impractical to be
achieved manually.
There are other formalisms that are at least equivalent
in computational power to CPNs, but not in regard to
convenience. Similar arguments apply as in the choice
oftherightprogramminglanguagetosolveagivenprob-
lem.
4.1 Colored Petri Nets (CPN)
The CPNs presented in this paper use the following no-
tation (cf. ﬁgure 1). They contain places (ellipses) and
transitions (rectangles). Places (a.k.a. states)r e p r e s e n t
conditions while transitions represent actions. Places
can contain instantiations, called tokens, of structured
data types, called colors (italic names next to places),
hence the name Colored Petri Nets. The distribution of
tokens at places is called a marking. The initial marking
is determined by an initialization expression (font hel-
vetica expressions next to places; ﬁgure 2). The mark-
ing (boldface font helvetica expression next to places;
ﬁgure 2) for each place is a multi-set (cf. [24,
x
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a deﬁnition of multi-sets) over the place’s color set.
Places and transitions can be connected by directed
arcs (arrows). Transitions are enabled if there are to-
kens in all places associated with incident arcs. An en-
abled transition can ﬁre, if token values are bound ac-
cording to relevant arc expressions (typewriter expres-
sions nextto arcs) and the guard (typewriter expressions
enclosed in square brackets next to transitions) associ-
ated with the transition evaluates to true. A transition
ﬁres by removing the required tokens from all places
connected through incident edges and by adding tokens
to all places connected through emanating edges. Arc
and guard expressions may have a set of variables as-
sociated with them. The substitution of values for vari-
ables can lead to their uniﬁcation if they have common
instances. In CPNs the binding of values to these vari-
ables is equivalent to their uniﬁcation ([45,
x
8
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We use an extension ([25] and [29, Part 3]) of the
programming language ML (Meta Language;[ 3 0 ,4 8 ] )
to deﬁne colors, arc expressions, guards, and code sec-
tions. ML is a strongly typed, high-level functional pro-
gramming language optimized for abstract data struc-
ture speciﬁcation and manipulation. The strong typing
forces designers to be speciﬁc about the data types of
representedinformationand ensuresunambiguousinter-
face speciﬁcations for the combinationof CPNs. For the
manipulation and simulation of CPNs we use the De-
sign/CPN softwarefromthe UniversityofAarhus([29]).
It uses ML as the speciﬁcation language of choice.
CPNs can be speciﬁed formally without a graphi-
cal representation: as a tuple consisting of a number
of sets (color, place, transition, and arc sets) and func-
tions (node, color, guard, arc expression, and initializa-
tion functions), as in [24, deﬁnition 2.5]. This method
of speciﬁcation of CPNs is necessary for a number of
formal analysis methods by which properties of CPNs
can be proven. We chose a graphical representation of
CPNs over its set theoretic representation to graphically
express the structure of modeled systems.
4.2 Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets
(HCPN)
Figures 1 and 4 illustrate separate mechanisms that are
used to build ﬁrewalls. Firewalls consist of a set of
mechanisms that collectively provide network access
control. Furthermore, they use external functions, such
as authentication header veriﬁcation, and external state,
such as TCP connection state. For practical reasons it is
not desirable to create a single large CPN that speciﬁes
a given ﬁrewall system in a ﬂat structure.
The concept of Hierarchical CPNs allows a designer
to construct large CPNs by combining a number of
smaller CPNs. They are beneﬁcial for the modular com-
position of CPNs. HCPNs are deﬁned in [19]. HCPNs
can be constructed top-down, bottom-up, or by a mix-
ture of these two strategies. HCPNs make it possible to
relate a number of individual CPNs to each other in a
formal way, and thus allow their formal analysis ([24]).
In a top-down design one starts with a simple high-
level description of a system without consideration for
internal details. A speciﬁcation of detailed behav-
ior of the CPN is developed through stepwise reﬁne-
ment ([49]). Stepwise reﬁnement is achieved through
the application of a construct called substitution tran-
sition, where a more complex CPN takes the place
of a transition. The CPN must conform to the in-
terface of the replaced transition and relate identically
to its surrounding arcs. Transitions Packet Filter and
Authentication Headerin ﬁgure2areexamplesofsub-
stitution transitions.
In a bottom-up design CPNs are combined into a
larger net through fusion places. A fusion place is a
set of places that are considered to be identical. Even
if they are drawn as individual places they represent a
3FltrRequest dgramr P In
FltrPassed dgramr P Out
FltrDcde
[rf = filter acl 
 {dstip   = (# dstip (# iphdr d)),
  dstport = (# dstport (# tcphdr d)),
  proto   = (# proto (# iphdr d))}]
FltrPass [rf = FLTRPASS] FltrFail [rf = FLTRFAIL]
FltrDecided dgramdecdr
Audit audtr FG Audit
Secondary Page: IP Packet Filter
1‘d
1‘d
1‘{dgram=d,fltrrslt=rf} 1‘{dgram=d,fltrrslt=rf}
1‘{dgram=d,fltrrslt=rf}
1‘(now(),r1(
   {fltrrslt=rf,
    iphdr =(# iphdr d),
    tcphdr=(# tcphdr d)}))
Figure 1: Example of a Colored Petri Net for IP packet ﬁltering
4singleconceptualplace. Foreachtokenthatisadded(re-
moved) at one of the places, an identical token is added
(removed) at all others. Places FltrRequest in ﬁgure 1
and P1 in ﬁgure 2 are a fusion place, for example.
A non-hierarchical CPN is called a page. Figures 1,
2, and 4 contain pages. A page that contains a substi-
tution transition is called a superpage (e.g., ﬁgure 2); a
page that contains the detailed description of the activ-
ity modeled by the corresponding substitution transition
is called subpage (e.g., ﬁgure 1). A substitution tran-
sition is also called a supernode. Note that the places
connected to a substitution transition by a single arc
(called socket nodes) and their counterparts on the sub-
page (called port nodes) are fusion places. The interface
between a superpage and a subpage is deﬁned through
port assignments where socket nodes are related to port
nodes.
4.3 Equivalence of CPNs and HCPNs
Any HCPN can be translated into a behaviorally equiva-
lentnon-hierarchicalCPN byreplacingeachsubstitution
node with a copy of its subpage. This replacement pro-
cess may need to be applied recursively. The recursion
is guaranteed to terminate because a strictly hierarchical
relationship between pages is enforced during construc-
tion. HCPNs are equivalent to CPNs, which means the
theoretical modelingpower of the two classes are identi-
cal. However,theyhavedifferentpropertiesfroma prac-
ticalpointofview: HCPNsallowadesignertocopewith
large systems because of their facilities for structuring
and abstraction.
4.4 Limitations
The original model of Petri Nets has several limitations
that since have been addressed by extensions to the ba-
sic model. For example, in Petri Nets there is no way to
test if zero tokens are in an unbounded place (cf. [32]).
AlthoughPetri Netscan be used formodelingsystemsat
different levels of abstraction, in their original form they
can be difﬁcult to comprehend by humans, even when
a system is expressed at a high-level. Hierarchical Col-
ored Petri Nets are one example of an extended model
whichalreadydeals with a subset of the originalmodel’s
limitations.
Many known algorithms that operate on Petri Nets
havehighcomputationalcomplexities([24, Ch.4,5]). As
long as CPNs are only used for their expressive power
this limitation is not relevant. But several interesting
properties of CPNs, such as boundedness, or the ab-
sence of deadlocks,requirethe applicationof algorithms
with high computational complexity. High computa-
tional complexity, however, can still be acceptable if it
is sufﬁcient to verify the properties in question infre-
quently and outside of performance critical paths, such
as at the time of design validation ([12, Ch.2]). Be-
cause of the high computational complexity of formal
veriﬁcation of properties, high-level formalisms have a
disadvantagecomparedto low-levelformalisms, such as
the originally deﬁned Petri Nets ([50]). Section 7 gives
details on the computational complexity and analyses
methods for CPNs. In general, low-level formalisms are
a better choice for the formal analysis of systems ([50]).
These capabilities are a trade-off for a greater expres-
siveness in high-level formalisms.
5 Example: HCPN for a simple IP
Firewall
This section describes an example ﬁrewall that com-
bines two ﬁrewall mechanisms, an IP packet ﬁlter and
an IPSEC (IP security working group) authentication
header module. We structure the description top-down,
starting with the superpage.
Theﬁrewall systemmodeledinﬁgure2is asuperpage
consistingof two components: an IPpacket ﬁlter, and an
AH module. Places P1, P2,a n dP3 contain tokens of
color dgramrthat represent IP datagrams. The two com-
ponents are represented as substitution transitions, with
the packet ﬁlter from ﬁgure 1 being applied ﬁrst. Each
instantiation d of color dgramr in place P1 represents
a datagram d that arrives at the ﬁrewall. Note that d is
a transmission unit as deﬁned in section 2 and d
2 l T.
Once substitution transition Packet Filter ﬁres, d is re-
moved from place P1. It is only added to place P2 if d
is added to place FltrPassed (ﬁgure 1), a fusion place
of P2, within the subpage.
Thus, only datagrams that pass the transition
Packet Filter successfully can be input to the transi-
tion Authentication Header representing the IPSEC
AH ﬁrewall component. All datagrams that are added
to place P3 therefore have passed both ﬁrewall compo-
nentssuccessfully and can be forwardedto their destina-
tion. Figure2 depictsplaceAudit which modelsan audit
function collecting audit events.
Remark. The meaning of arcs aroundsubstitution transi-
tions, such as Packet Filter, differsfrom the meaning of
arcs around regular transitions. The set of arcs around a
substitution transition describes an interface of the sub-
stituted CPN rather than a uniﬁcation of common in-
stances that must occur. It means that datagrams that are
removedfromplaceP1 becausetransitionPacket Filter
ﬁresneed notbe addedto placeP2. Theyare onlyadded
if they appear in the fusion place correspondingto place
P2.
5P1 dgramr
1‘{iphdr={srcip="13.1.64.93", dstip="128.10.17.72", proto=PFTCP}, 
    ahdr=1407,
    tcphdr={srcport=39256, dstport=21},
    data="some ftp access data"} +
1‘{iphdr={srcip="13.1.64.94", dstip="128.10.17.72", proto=PFTCP}, 
    ahdr=1407,
    tcphdr={srcport=14392, dstport=23},
    data="some telnet access data"} +
1‘{iphdr={srcip="13.1.64.95", dstip="128.10.17.72", proto=PFTCP}, 
    ahdr=4711,
    tcphdr={srcport=41926, dstport=21},
    data="some ftp access data"}
P2 dgramr
P3 dgramr 1
1‘{iphdr = {srcip = "13.1.64.93",dstip = "128.10.17.72",proto = PFTCP},
     ahdr = 1407,
     tcphdr = {srcport = 39256,dstport = 21},
     data = "some ftp access data"}
HS ah#2 Authentication
        Header
Packet Filter HS pf#4
Primary Page: IP/IPSEC firewall
Audit FG Audit audtr
2 1‘(859680273,r1(
     {fltrrslt = FLTRFAIL,
       iphdr = {srcip = "13.1.64.94",dstip = "128.10.17.72",proto = PFTCP},
       tcphdr = {srcport = 14392,dstport = 23}}))+ 
1‘(859680273,r2(
     {vrfyrslt = VRFYFAIL,
       iphdr = {srcip = "13.1.64.95",dstip = "128.10.17.72",proto = PFTCP},
       ahdr = 4711,
       tcphdr = {srcport = 41926,dstport = 21}}))
1‘d
1‘d
1‘d
1‘d
Figure 2: Hierarchical Colored Petri Net for a simple IP ﬁrewall consisting of an IP packet ﬁlter and IPSEC authenti-
cation header module.
65.1 IP Packet Filtering
In a TCP/IP packet ﬁltering ﬁrewall each datagram that
arrives at the ﬁrewall router is passed to a packet ﬁlter-
ing mechanism. The ﬁlter discards or forwards pack-
ets according to speciﬁed rules based on the ﬁelds of
the TCP/IP packet header, e.g., source and destination
addresses and port numbers. The rules operate exclu-
sively on the contents of the datagram, because no con-
text is maintained across datagrams that belong to the
same connection.
Incurrentpacketﬁlteringrouters,securitypoliciesare
translated into lists of rules (see [5], [9], [14]). Each
rule allows or denies data through the ﬁrewall based on
some semantic interpretation of the data contents. Rules
may interact with each other, e.g., through their order. If
no rule is applicable a default action is performed, e.g.,
“discard packet.”
Although a packet ﬁlter offers the opportunity to han-
dle and verify all data passing through it, the lack of
end-to-end context prevents a security association from
being established. Packet ﬁltering does not provide in-
tegrity and authenticity control of the examined packets.
The application of ﬁltering rules to each datagram intro-
duces some delay because their processing takes time.
It may introduce jitter because the calculation of ﬁlter-
ing results can introduce different amounts of delay for
different packets. Although efforts have been made to
automate (and improve the quality of) the generation of
the ﬁltering rule set (see e.g., [8]), expressing high level
security policies in this low level mechanism is still a
practical challenge.
Figure 1 gives a CPN speciﬁcation of a typical IP
packet ﬁlter. It models the invocation, ﬁltering decision,
and decision enforcement of a packet ﬁlter.
Each datagramthat arrivesat the packet ﬁlter is repre-
sented by a token of colordgramrin place FltrRequest.
In this example, a datagram (type dgramr) consists of
several possible types of headers (types iphdrr, ahdrr,
tcphdrr) and a data portion (cf. ﬁgure 3 for the ML dec-
laration of colors in this example). The header contains
a subset of the TCP/IP header ﬁelds. It does not contain
all header ﬁelds as deﬁned in [36], but rather those that
are necessary and sufﬁcient to perform the packet ﬁlter-
ing operation in this simple example. The header ﬁelds
are used by the packet ﬁlter to decide if the datagram is
to be forwarded or discarded.
The transition FltrDcde is enabled whenever the
marking of place FltrRequest contains at least one to-
ken, i.e., whenevera datagramarrivesat the packet ﬁlter.
Variable d is then bound to the datagram values, which
uniﬁes all occurrences of d to this instance. The guard
associated with FltrDcde uses function filter to ap-
ply the access control list deﬁned in acl (cf. ﬁgure 3)
against d and assigns the result to rf (FLTRFAIL or
FLTRPASS). Function filter takes two arguments:
a list of tuples containing patterns and their correspond-
ing results (acl), and a pattern. It returns the result cor-
responding to the pattern if found in the access control
list, and the default safe value FLTRFAIL otherwise.
The access control policy for IP packets is not encoded
in the CPN model, but in acl. This CPN model merely
describes a mechanism for enforcing whatever policy is
encoded.
Once transition FltrDcde is ﬁred, d is removed from
place FltrRequest. Datagram d and its ﬁltering re-
sult rf are combined into a token of color dgramdecdr,
a record type, and added to place FltrDecided. Depend-
ing on the value of variable rf exactly one of the two
transitionsFltrFail andFltrPassisenabledbecauseboth
are guarded by mutually exclusive but collectively ex-
haustive expressions. Note that a guard expression, such
as [rf = FLTRFAIL], is no assignment but rather a
test for equality: after the ﬁrst assignment to variablerf
in the guard of transition FltrDcde all occurrences of
rf are uniﬁed and assignment and test for equality are
denotedbythesame symbol(=)althoughtheyarediffer-
entoperations. Therefore,guardsin CPNsarepredicates
with side effects.
In case transition FltrFail is enabledand consequently
ﬁred, ﬁgure 1 models information about datagram d be-
i ngaddedt opl aceAudit. Thisprocesscanbeinterpreted
as the datagram being discarded and details about the
denied access being logged. The place is included to
be able to collect information about discarded packets
for auditing purposes as well as the validation of the be-
havior of the packet ﬁlter itself. If transition FltrPass
is enabled, then d is added to place FltrPassed. Place
FltrPassed is the ﬁnal place in this CPN. Each data-
gram in a marking of FltrPassed can now be forwarded
towards its destination.
5.2 Modeling the IPSEC Authentication
Header Module
This section serves three purposes. It gives a second ex-
ample of a CPN ﬁrewall mechanism (the IP Authenti-
cation Header as deﬁned in [2]), it demonstrates how to
build a CPN model for it, and it demonstrates how the
model interacts with its environmentin an abstract man-
ner (e.g., through use of external state or execution of
external functionality).
Section 4 of the IETF (Internet Engineering Task
Force) standard document for the IP authentication
header ([2]) speciﬁes the procedurea module has to per-
form to verify the authentication header in a received IP
packet1:
1Note: SPI stands for security parameter index, an end-to-end se-
7color  datat      = string;
color  ipt        = string;
color  portt      = int;
color  protot     = with PFUDP | PFTCP;
color  spit       = int;
color  ait        = int;
color  timet      = int;
color  iphdrr     = record srcip:ipt * dstip:ipt * proto:protot;
color  ahdrr      = spit;
color  tcphdrr    = record srcport:portt * dstport:portt;
color  dgramr     = record iphdr:iphdrr * ahdr:ahdrr * tcphdr:tcphdrr * data:datat;
color  fltrrsltt  = with FLTRFAIL | FLTRPASS;
color  dgramdecdr = record dgram:dgramr * fltrrslt:fltrrsltt;
color  spir       = record spidx:spit   * dstip:ipt * ai:ait;
color  dgramspir  = record dgram:dgramr * spi:spir;
color  vrfyrsltt  = with VRFYFAIL | VRFYPASS;
color  dgramvrfyr = record dgram:dgramr * vrfyrslt:vrfyrsltt;
color  fltrfailar = record fltrrslt:fltrrsltt * iphdr:iphdrr * tcphdr:tcphdrr;
color  vrfyfailar = record vrfyrslt:vrfyrsltt * iphdr:iphdrr * ahdr:ahdrr *
                           tcphdr:tcphdrr;
color  audtu      = union r1:fltrfailar + r2:vrfyfailar;
color  audtr      = product timet * audtu;
(*--------------------------------------------------*)
(*filter = fn : (’’a * fltrrsltt) list -> ’’a -> fltrrsltt*)
fun filter acl dgram = 
  lookup dgram acl handle exlookup => FLTRFAIL;
(*verify = fn : spir -> dgramr -> vrfyrsltt*)
fun verify (s:spir) (d:dgramr) =
  case (# ai s) of 
    42 => VRFYPASS |
    _  => VRFYFAIL;
(*now = fn : unit -> int*)
fun now () = tod ();
(*--------------------------------------------------*)
val acl = nil;
val acl = insert {dstip="128.10.17.72", dstport=21, proto=PFTCP} FLTRPASS acl;
(*--------------------------------------------------*)
var d  : dgramr;
var s  : spir;
var rv : vrfyrsltt;
var rf : fltrrsltt;
Figure 3: Example declaration of colors for the Colored Petri Net model of IP packet ﬁltering and speciﬁcation of an
access control list for IP packet ﬁltering. Access to host 128.10.17.72 is granted for TCP on service port 21 (ftp). All
other accesses are denied.
8‘‘Upon receipt of a packet con-
taining an IP Authentication
Header, the receiver first uses
the Destination Address and SPI
value to locate the correct Se-
curity Association. The receiver
then independently verifies that
the Authentication Data field
and the received data packet are
consistent. [..]
[..] If the processing of the
authentication algorithm indi-
cates the datagram is valid, then
it is accepted. If the algo-
rithm determines that the data and
the Authentication Header do not
match, then the receiver SHOULD
discard the received IP datagram
as invalid and MUST record the
authentication failure in the sys-
tem log or audit log. If such a
failure occurs, the recorded log
data MUST include the SPI value,
date/time received, clear-text
Sending Address, clear-text Desti-
nation Address, and (if it exists)
the clear-text Flow ID. The log
data MAY also include other infor-
mation about the failed packet.’’
This procedurecan be divided into four steps as follows:
1. Receipt of packet
2. Location of security association
3. Veriﬁcation of authentication data ﬁeld
4. Enforcement of authentication veriﬁcation result
Figure4depictstheCPN fortheAHmechanism. Step
1 is modeled through an instantiation of color dgramr
in initial place AhRequest. Place SpiDb models ex-
ternal state: the set of established security associations.
The lookup (step 2) of a security association is achieved
through the matching of the security parameter index
ﬁeld present in the authentication header of datagram d
against the spi index values in members of the marking
of place SpiDb. It is reasonable to model the repository
of security parameter indices (SPI) in this fashion be-
cause SPIs are established by external procedures, such
as manual conﬁguration or a key management proto-
col. Key management mechanisms are used to negotiate
parameters other than keys to manage security associa-
tions.
curity association.
The veriﬁcation of the authentication data ﬁeld
(Step 3) takes place in the guard of transition AhVrfy
similar to the way we modeled ﬁltering in ﬁgure 1.
Our model contains a stub routine for the authentication
header veriﬁcation (see function verify in ﬁgure 4).
The datagram d is then assigned to place AhPassed if
theoutcomeof theveriﬁcationispositive. Subsequently,
the enforcement of the result takes place (step 4).
In case the result is VRFYPASS, d will be added to
place AhPassed and continue on its path through the
system. In case the result is VRFYFAIL, certain infor-
mation from d will be augmented by further data ﬁelds,
such as a time stamp, and added to place Audit.T h i s
models the audit requirement as speciﬁed in [2,
x
4].
The marking of place SpiDb in ﬁgure 4 contains two
examplesof securityassociations. The expressionabove
the place is the initialization expression for the state; the
one below is its current marking. The particular values
of these markings were used in a simulation and are not
of speciﬁc interest because they were chosen arbitrarily.
Note that in this model the marking of place SpiDb will
alwaysbeidenticaltotheinitialmarkingbecauseatoken
thatisuniﬁedtosforthematchingthattakesplaceinthe
guard for transition SpiLkup is returned to place SpiDb
after transition SpiLkup is ﬁred.
5.3 Interpretation of Simulation Results
for the Example Firewall
We used the designCPN ([29]) CPN software for simu-
lations of this ﬁrewall model. Figures 1, 2, and 4 display
the markings of the model when no more transitions are
enabled, i.e., after the end of a simulation. In ﬁgure 2
place P3 has instances of color dgramr in its ﬁnal mark-
ing, and place Audit has instances of color audtr in its
ﬁnal marking.
The tokens that are part of the marking in place Audit
recorded events where datagrams did not pass the ﬁre-
wall. The ﬁrst token contains one audit record describ-
ing denied access enforced by the packet ﬁlter because
the access policy encoded in the access control list acl
allowed access only to the ftp port 21 (see ﬁgure 5).
The second token in place Audit represents a data-
gram that did not pass the authentication veriﬁcation be-
cause we simulated an authenticationfailure for security
parameters index 4711 and its bound authentication in-
formation 43. Only authentication information 42 leads
to a positive veriﬁcation result in function verify in
ﬁgure 6. Finally, the token in place P3 passed both the
packet ﬁltering and the authentication veriﬁcation and
reached the ﬁnal state of the CPN.
The color of the audit place is a product type contain-
ing a time stamp and a union type. The union type de-
pends upon the type of the logged information. Events
9SpiLkup
[(# spidx s) = (# ahdr d) 
 andalso
 (# dstip s) =
  (# dstip (# iphdr d))]
AhPassed P Out dgramr
AhRequest P In dgramr
AhSpiMatched dgramspir
AhVerified dgramvrfyr
AhVrfy [rv = verify s d]
AhPass [rv = VRFYPASS] AhFail [rv = VRFYFAIL]
SpiDb spir
1‘{spidx=1407,dstip="128.10.17.72", ai=42}+
1‘{spidx=4711,dstip="128.10.17.72", ai=43}
2
1‘{spidx = 1407,dstip = "128.10.17.72",ai = 42}+ 
1‘{spidx = 4711,dstip = "128.10.17.72",ai = 43}
Audit audtr FG Audit
Secondary Page: IPSEC Authentication Header Module
1‘d
1‘{dgram=d,spi=s}
1‘{dgram=d,spi=s}
1‘{dgram=d,vrfyrslt=rv}
1‘d
1‘s
1‘{dgram=d,vrfyrslt=rv}
1‘{dgram=d,vrfyrslt=rv}
1‘s
1‘(now(),r2(
   {vrfyrslt=rv,
    iphdr =(# iphdr d),
    ahdr  =(# ahdr d),
    tcphdr=(# tcphdr d)}))
Figure 4: Example IPSEC authentication header
val acl = nil;
val acl = insert
fdstip="128.10.17.72", dstport=21, proto=PFTCP
g FLTRPASS acl;
Figure 5: Example access control list. Access is only allowed to the ftp port (21) on the host with IP address
128.10.17.72. (Excerpt from previous ﬁgure 3.)
(*verify = fn : spir -> dgramr -> vrfyrsltt*)
fun verify (s:spir) (d:dgramr) =
case (# ai s) of
42 => VRFYPASS |
=> VRFYFAIL;
Figure 6: Example veriﬁcation function implementing the policy that only authentication information 42 is accept-
able. More realistically, this function would be replaced by cryptographic authentication code as implemented in our
prototype. (Excerpt from previous ﬁgure 3.)
10are logged by adding an arc from the transition repre-
senting the event’saction to an audit place. In our exam-
ple we used a fusion place for modeling the audit so that
all logged events are collected in the same place. Infor-
mation present at a transition as well as global state can
be logged. Information (in contrast to events) does not
need to be logged at the earliest transition because it is
representedin a naturalway in this model: instantiations
of colors. It could be carried through the execution of a
CPN as partof a token. We do notpostulate which infor-
mation is logged at what place in the net but we provide
a simple method for modeling audit mechanisms. The
research of others addresses the question of content (see
e.g., [38]).
5.4 Challenges of Modeling
We gave an example of how to model ﬁrewall mecha-
n i s m si ns e c t i o n5 . 2 .
Creating CPNs is a task that requires human expertise
and experience, similar to other modeling techniques.
Jensen providesa numberof guidelinesin [24,
x
1
:
5]that
can help modelers develop CPNs.
Designers need to understandthe behavior of a mech-
anism before they can formalize it, which represents a
problem if a given ﬁrewall mechanism is offered as a
closed platform only. Designers can infer its behavior
onlythroughobservation,marketingbrochures,andpos-
sibly reverse engineering. Possible mismatches between
the real ﬁrewall mechanism and its functional descrip-
tion can be difﬁcult to detect.
One can imagine that vendors will provide formal de-
scriptionsofthebehavioroftheirproductsasa serviceto
their(potential)customers. Usingthe tool, guidedbythe
formalism of the HCPNs, and using a library of generic
ﬁrewalls and speciﬁc CPNs for ﬁrewall components, we
can provide a beneﬁcial design environment. Silva and
Valette ([46]) argues that catalogs of well tested sub-
nets allow component reusability which in turn leads to
signiﬁcant reductions in the modeling effort. The avail-
ability of such a library should encourage the adoption
of HCPN technology by ﬁrewall designers, who would
not need to create the models from scratch. This library
would enable designers to explore various ﬁrewall de-
signsusingtheavailableproductformalizationsinasim-
ulation environment.
6 Simulation
Once a ﬁrewall mechanism or even a complete ﬁrewall
system are modeled, our approach allows the simulation
of nets. Statistics of simulations can provide insights
about characteristics, such as timing constraints and ca-
pacity requirements and simulation enables the explo-
ration of various designs.
6.1 Testing
Simulation enables ﬁrewall testing: for example,
recorded sequences of datagrams can be played back as
input to a CPN simulator modeling the behavior of a
ﬁrewall design under consideration. Sequences of data-
grams representing attacks can be constructed to deter-
mine how a ﬁrewall design can handle them. Further-
more, the testing of security policies is possible: an
HCPN model would serve as a framework for the call
to the function that calculates the policy decision (e.g.,
functionfilter with policy representationacl in ﬁg-
ure 3). Observedbehavior of the policy decision module
can then be examined against expected behavior.
This approach is not sufﬁcient to prove correctness of
a system, but can at best reveal errors, similar to testing
in software engineering ([22]).
6.2 Performance Analysis
The performanceof ﬁrewall systems can be investigated
through the use of Timed Colored Petri Nets.S e v -
eral extensions to CPNs to introduce time are possible.
Jensen’sTimedCPNs are CPNs whereplacesandtransi-
tions consume time and tokens are augmented by a time
stamp. Time stamps contain the time after which a to-
ken is ready to be consumed by a transition. A global
clock (discrete or continuous) keeps track of the simu-
lation time. Simulations in timed CPNs are run analo-
gously to discrete event simulations.
Values, such as “the average number of tokens in a
given place” or “the average waiting time of a token in a
given place,” can be determined by simulations in timed
CPNs. In our previous examples, tokens represented
datagrams traversing a ﬁrewall system. The calculated
values would thereforegive designers proﬁling informa-
tion, such as datagram delays in certain ﬁrewall func-
tions. Estimates or measurements in a real world sys-
tem must precede the simulation. The approach is use-
ful in cases where analytical solutions throughother for-
mal approaches, such as Markov chains, cannot be ob-
tained because their equation systems become too com-
plex to solve ([23]). The introduction of timing infor-
mation can result in inﬁnite occurrence graphs (see sec-
tion 7.1) for systems that have ﬁnite occurrence graphs
otherwise([23]). By specifyingequivalenceclasses over
the time domain one can limit these inﬁnite occurrence
graphs to ﬁnite subgraphs for which the dynamic prop-
erties and performance characteristics can still be deter-
mined ([23]).
116.3 Design Tool
Exploration of various designs is desirable because crit-
ical aspects of systems, such as single points of failure,
can be determined. A design tool for ﬁrewall systems is
expected to be beneﬁcial in the early stages of ﬁrewall
design: compared to prototyping,system simulation is a
lowcostalternativefordesignexploration. Furthermore,
this approach is beneﬁcial over a white paper evaluation
because dynamic properties of components can be ex-
plored. Note that this approach is not speciﬁc to ﬁrewall
design, but system design in general. McLendon and
Vidale describe a similar approach in their research on
modeling and analysis of an ADA system in [28].
7 Formal Analysis of CPNs
The early detection of design errors saves design time
and costs ([7]). Jensen ([24, Ch.4,5]) lists a number
of possible properties of Colored Petri Nets that can be
analyzed by informal or formal analysis methods. The
properties are divided into static and dynamic proper-
ties. Static (or structural) properties characterize CPNs
without consideration of possible occurrence sequences
while dynamic (or behavioral) properties characterize
the behavior of instantiated CPNs. In general, dynamic
properties are more difﬁcult to verify than static proper-
ties, especially if one relies on informal methods. For-
mal analysis methods for dynamic properties often are
of high computational complexity because they need to
explore large combinatorial spaces.
7.1 Occurrence Graphs as the Basis for
Analysis
Occurrence graphs are directed acyclic graphs (see [12,
x
5
:
4]). Their nodes represent the reachable markings
of CPNs, and their arcs represent variable bindings be-
tween nodes. Their construction is a partially decidable
problem. An algorithm exists that halts if and only if the
occurrence graph is ﬁnite. Otherwise the algorithm does
not terminate ([23, Prop. 1.4]).
The possible state explosion of occurrence graphs is
a known problem (cf. [21, 28]). One can apply ad hoc
reductions of occurrence graphs. However, those reduc-
tions usually do not preserve the behavior and proper-
ties of the original model. Jensen discusses in [22,
x
4
:
2]
a variety of approaches for the reduction of occurrence
graphs, such as by means of covering markings, by ig-
noring some of the occurrencesequences that are identi-
cal, by means of symmetries, or by expressing states as
symbolic expressions.
Even if the occurrence graph is ﬁnite, its construction
may still take a long time because occurrencegraphs are
generally large. The size of the graphs is dependent on
several factors, such as the modeled problem or the re-
quired color sets and their domains. For example, the
number of nodes in the occurrence graph for the dining
philosophers problem as modeled in [23,
x
1
:
6]g r o w sa s
a Fibonacci series, i.e.,
N
(
n
)
=
N
(
n
￿
1
)
+
N
(
n
￿
2
),
where
N
(
2
)
=
3 and
N
(
3
)
=
4. The growth of Fi-
bonacci numbers is exponential ([12,
x
2
:
2]).
The constructionof the occurrencegraphsis the dom-
inantcostin the analysisofdynamicpropertiesofCPNs.
Many algorithms of interest to us, such as those de-
scribed in [23] that operate on occurrence graphs, are of
at most polynomial complexity. Therefore, the smaller
the occurrence graph the lower the requirements for
computation time. There are methods which reduce the
size of occurrence graphs by exploiting symmetry and
equivalence relations (see [23, Ch. 2,3]).
7.2 Invariants
Consider predicates which may be applied to the states
of a system. A predicateis calledan invariantif andonly
if it is valid in each state. Jensen explains the theory and
use of invariants in [23, Ch. 4]. In CPNs there are place
and transition invariants, and they are applied in the fol-
lowing way: First, equations are formulated which are
postulated to be always satisﬁed. Second, it is proven
that the equations are indeed satisﬁed. Third, the equa-
tions are then used to prove some of the dynamic prop-
erties of the modeled system (e.g., reachability, bound-
edness, home, liveness, and fairness). Place invariants
are interpreted as sums of tokens which remain constant
with the ﬁring of transitions. Transition invariants deal
with repetitive ﬁring sequences.
Invariant analysis can prove structural properties of
a CPN independent of its marking. Invariants have an
advantage over occurrence graphs insofar as they avoid
the possible state explosion.
Invariants over the number of datagrams in a net can
be used to answer questions about ﬁrewall mechanisms,
such as these:
￿ Did all datagrams that reach the ﬁnal acceptance
states originate in an authorized start state? A ver-
iﬁed invariant to that extent assures that no trans-
mission units that reach ﬁnal states can get intro-
duced into the ﬁrewall through means other than
placement in initial states. In other words, ﬁrewall
controls cannot be bypassed.
￿ Do certain attributes of transmission units adhere
to a desired functional relationship? A ﬁrst sim-
ple example of such a functional relationship is the
identity function. It can be used to ensure that at-
tributes, such as destination machine address and
12port numbers, do not change during net execution.
A second example is a function mapping internal
addresses to externally visible addresses, such as in
network address translation (NAT) ﬁrewall mecha-
nisms ([15]).
￿ Do all transmission units reach one of the deﬁned
ﬁnal states representing acceptance or rejection?
An invariant to that extent that holds would assure
thatnotransmissionunitscanget lost intheﬁrewall
implementation. Such a loss would be interpreted
by the outside world as a possibly wrongful rejec-
tion of the datagram.
7.3 Static Analysis
Jensen deﬁnes in [24,
x
4
:
1] a set of static properties on
arc expressions and transitions. A static analysis of the
type of CPN models which are generated by our ap-
proach(e.g., in ﬁgures1, 2, and 4) revealsthat all arc ex-
pressions are uniform with multiplicity 1, all transitions
are uniform, all transitions are conservative, all transi-
tions, except transition SpiLkup have the state machine
property, the primary page net in ﬁgure 2 is open be-
cause it has places as border nodes, and all secondary
pagenetsareclosedbecausetheyhavetransitionsasbor-
der nodes.
The previous properties determine that the CPNs as
constructed have a simple structure. Most transitions
areconservativewith thestate machinepropertybecause
they represent actions on single transmission units (for
example datagrams). The transitions output single data
items (for example a transmission unit augmented to a
compound data structure by a result of the action taken:
record dgramvrfyr as in transition AhVrfy).
Sucha simplestructureis preferableoveramorecom-
plex structure because it adds less complexity to the oc-
currence graph. As we argued in section 7.1, smaller
occurrence graphs are an advantage during the formal
analysis of dynamic properties.
7.4 Dynamic Analysis
The dynamicanalysis of CPNs exploresproperties, such
as boundedness,liveness, home markings, conservation,
reachability, coverability, ﬁring sequences, equivalence
problems,a n dsubset problems. Deﬁnitions for these
properties can be found in [32] and [24]. In the follow-
ing we examine two of these properties in more detail:
boundedness and liveness.
Safety properties stipulate some bad condition never
occursduringtheexecutionofanet. Examplesforsafety
properties are boundedness, reachability, mutual exclu-
sion, and freedom from deadlock.
Bad conditions can be represented by an assertion,
P
b
a
d, which is mapped to
t
r
u
e in exactly those states
in which the condition is true. Therefore, if the safety
property is true of a net, no occurrence sequence can
contain such a state. Hence, the bad condition happens
at some particular point in the execution. For a safety
property to be true of a net,
:
P
b
a
d m u s tb ean e ti n v a r i -
ant. One way to demonstrate a safety property is to ﬁnd
a true program invariant
I,s ot h a t
I
)
:
P
b
a
d. Another
way to express this idea is through the use of tempo-
ral logic ([35]). Temporal logic introducestwo temporal
operators on assertions:
￿ (always) and
￿ (eventually).
A safety property can be expressed as:
￿
:
P
b
a
d.
The livenesspropertystipulates eventuallysome good
condition
Q
g
o
o
d will occur during the execution of the
net:
￿
Q
g
o
o
d. Owicki and Lamport ([31]) presents a for-
mal proofmethodbased on temporallogic and prooflat-
tices for deriving liveness properties of concurrent pro-
grams.
There is an interesting difference between safety and
liveness:
P
b
a
d in a safety property must be a discrete
event which occurs at some point in the execution while
Q
g
o
o
d in a liveness property need not be discrete or oc-
cur at some particular point.
7.4.1 Boundedness
Upper (lower) bounds on places indicate the maximum
(minimum)numberof tokensof a particularcolor which
can be in that place at a given time. The simple ﬁrewall
model in sections 5 has no upper bounds imposed on its
places. In particular, place Audit is not bounded.
The CPNs for the packet ﬁlter in ﬁgure 1 and the
authentication header module in ﬁgure 4 are modeling
mechanisms which in current implementations are ef-
fectively limited to dealing with one datagram at a time.
This restriction places upper bounds of 1 on all but the
initial (FltrRequest and AhRequest) and ﬁnal places
(FltrPassed, AhPassed,a n dAudit)o ft h e s eC P N s .
Places which represents external state, such as SpiDb,
are subject to their own boundedness constraints.
One often needs to specify an event may happen only
when a given condition does not hold, i.e., when the
corresponding token is absent. The attempt to match a
dgramr token to a spir token in transition SpiLkup in
ﬁgure4 can serveas an example. In the currentmodel,if
for a given token d no matchingtoken is presentin place
SpiDb,t o k e nd cannot make progress towards places
Audit or AhPassed. To solve the liveness problem in
nets with unboundedplaces, Heuser and Richter suggest
in [17] to use complementary places. The initial mark-
ing of a complementaryplace is the whole domainof the
key of the token color to match. Tests for boundedness
can discover these conditions.
13Boundednessconstraintsare also usefulto modellim-
ited resources. Bounded places imply ﬁnite capaci-
ties. Determining ﬁnite bounds of places can be used to
gather information about resource requirements at those
places.
7.4.2 Liveness
Liveness in a CPN means that a set of binding elements
remains active. Liveness in a ﬁrewall representation can
be interpretedas: everypossibledatagramstarting outin
place P1 will eventually reach a ﬁnal state (representing
acceptance or rejection of the datagram). This modeling
approach implies that a datagram cannot disappear be-
tween its entry to the net and its reaching the ﬁnal state.
8C o n c l u s i o n
This paper presented a method for modeling ﬁrewall
components and ﬁrewall systems alike. It is based on
a formalism that uses Hierarchical Colored Petri Nets
(HCPN, short CPN) to describe the functionality of
mechanisms used by ﬁrewall technology. HCPNs pro-
vide us with a theoretical framework and means of de-
scription, composition, simulation, and analysis of ﬁre-
wall systems.
We appliedthe formalismto a ﬁrewall system consist-
ing of an IP packet ﬁlter followed by the IP authentica-
tion header module. By doing so we introduced CPN
terminology and demonstrated how to model a network
security mechanism given only its verbatim standard’s
speciﬁcation. We built the model in a modular fash-
ion and demonstrated how the hierarchical concepts of
CPNs can be used to combine several mechanisms into
a comprehensive ﬁrewall system. We learned how to
model audit in CPN models. After we developed a basic
modeling technique, we used the Design/CPN tool for
the incremental building, syntax checking, and simula-
tion of ﬁrewall models.
We discussed how the simulation of ﬁrewall models
can be used for ﬁrewall and policy testing, for perfor-
manceanalysis, andasa basisforadesigntoolexploring
design alternatives. Finally, we listed a number of static
and dynamic (safety and liveness) properties deﬁned for
CPNs, which can be interpreted as desirable properties
in the problem domain of ﬁrewall systems.
The ﬁnal two sections of this paper present several
areas for future research. For example, it may be bene-
ﬁcial to further investigate the question of which desir-
able properties of ﬁrewall systems can be expressed as
dynamic properties, which in turn can be veriﬁed me-
chanically for HCPNs. We conjecture that concentrat-
ing on invariants as an analysis technique is likely to be
a rewarding strategy: invariants are difﬁcult to specify,
but are more practical to verify. They avoid the prob-
lem of state explosion in occurrence graphs. Some of
the properties that can be veriﬁed would allow design-
ers and maintainers to gain additional conﬁdence into a
ﬁrewall system under investigation.
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